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Metadata standards existing today range from very complex to very simple. Relative simplicity or complexity of metadata standards depends in large part on the resources for which they were created and the depth of description that is deemed necessary to make these resources accessible. This paper reviews the differences between metadata standards and current cataloging practices, and discusses how the various metadata standards are applied in libraries. In addressing these issues, the authors introduce definitions of key concepts of metadata and cataloging standards and provide an overview of the most common metadata schemes. The discussion of current cataloging practices includes an overview of the most commonly used cataloging practices and standards, the impact of metadata on library practice and the role of librarians related to metadata. The authors will discuss the OHIOLINK Electronic Thesis and Dissertations (ETD) as an example of how Anglo‐American Cataloging Rules 2nd (AACR2) and Machine Readable Cataloging (MARC21) are used as metadata to store, describe and access this unique information resource.

MOST of you would receive at the recent Annual Conference, a circular illustrating a paper by Mr. Chivers on “Library Bookbinding,” in which he describes “an experiment carried out in a large library with a book bound from the sheets in improved binding, and a book purchased in the ordinary way and twice re‐bound.” The pamphlet in question forms a suitable introduction to my remarks.

This paper is about how a command system allocated resources under profound uncertainty. The command system was the Soviet economy, the period was Stalin's dictatorship, and the resources were designated for military research & development. The context was formed by the limits of the existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it with another, and uncertainty as to how to do so. We observe the formation of a quasi-market in which rival agents proposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. We find rivalry and rent seeking, imperfectly regulated by principals. As rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, the quasi-market was closed down and replaced by strict hierarchical allocation and monitoring. In theory, a dictator cannot commit to refrain from taxing the returns from today's effort tomorrow; therefore, we expect agents in a command system to seek only short-term returns from quasi-market activity. Agents’ willingness to invest in the Soviet quasi-market for inventions is ascribed to a reputation mechanism that enforced long-run returns.